The purpose of this investigation is to test empirical the recent theoretical models concerning political budget cycles, and this with data for the OESO-countries. As point of departure we present the first empirical investigation about Rogoff's trail-blazing signalling-model (AER,1990). The central research question sounds: To what extent do the electoral and/or ideological motivations lead to a systematic manipulation of national tax systems. In other words, we're searching the evidence of the fact that politicians rearrange the fiscal pressure to draw the crucial groups of voters to them. What can be concrete expected ? As result from Rogoff's model, the tendency to reduce the personal taxes and to raise the corporation tax is present. In imitation of the existent literature the most important secondary research question is wich institutional features are making the political manipulation possible or ecourage them. We're reviewing for example the influence on the tax system assuming from the nature of the electoral system, the extent of the political stability, the rol of informal internationalising of economics and politics and the possible influences from pressure groups. This comparative analysis has in times of political revolution obvious topicality value.
|Effective start/end date||1/01/00 → 31/12/03|
Flemish discipline codes
- Economics and business
- public choice