Abstract
How can differences in Member States (MS) capacities to coordinate European Union (EU) decision-making processes influence their bargaining success? Based on a new dataset collected with Council representatives and policy experts in Brussels, this research shows how informal MS capacities can partly shape legislative outcomes in the EU under certain conditions. This research provides evidence that informal capacities, such as the effectiveness of MS permanent representations and/or their capacity to coordinate with other actors in the legislative decision-making, matter for bargaining success. Using a mixed-method design, this research illustrates how both the structure preference allocation and thresholds of formal power are conditions of informal power resource activation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 97-116 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Journal of European Public Policy |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2 Jan 2022 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Grant CSO2015-67213-C2-2-P; it was also supported by the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union under Grants 611941–EPP- 1-2019-1-ES-EPP-JMO- CoE (Barcelona Center for European Studies) and 600488–EPP- 1- 2019- 1- ES- EPPJMO- CHAIR (Jean Monnet Chair in European Governance) We thank Robert Thomson, Mareike Kleine, Jonas Lefevere, Samuel Standaert, Francesco Camonita, David Puig, the editors and the anonymous reviewers for comments that improved previous versions of this article.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.