Eccentric positionality as a precondition for the criminal liability of artificial life forms

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This contribution explores Plessner's distinction between animal centricity and human eccentricity as "a difference that makes a difference" for the attribution of criminal liability to artificial life forms (ALFs). Building on the work of Steels and Bourgine & Varela on artificial life and Matura & Varela's notion of autopoiesis I will reason that even if ALFs are autonomous in the sense even of having the capacity to rewrite their own program, this in itself is not enough to understand them as autonomous in the sense of instantiating an eccentric position that allows for reflection on their actions as their own actions. Evidently this also means that to the extent that ALFs do develop some sort of conscious self-reflection they would in principle qualify for the censure of the criminal law.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPlessner’s Philosophical Anthropology
EditorsJos De Mul
Place of PublicationAmsterdam
PublisherAmsterdam University Press
Pages407-424
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)978-90-8964-634-7
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Bibliographical note

De Mul, Jos

Keywords

  • criminal liability
  • artificial life forms
  • eccentricity
  • autonomic computing
  • autonomous action
  • action vs. behaviour

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