Evolution of fairness and conditional cooperation in public goods dilemmas

Sven Van Segbroeck, Jorge M. Pacheco, Tom Lenaerts, Francisco C. Santos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Cooperation prevails in many collective endeavours. To ensure that co-operators are not exploited by free riders, mechanisms need to be put into place to protect them. Direct reciprocity, one of these mechanisms, relies on the facts that individuals often interact more than once, and that they are capable of retaliating when exploited. Yet in groups, strategies targeting retaliation against specific group members may be unfeasible, because individuals may not be able to identify clearly who contributed and who did not. Still, they may assess what constitutes a fair income from a collective endeavour. We discuss here how conditional cooperation in group interactions emerges naturally and how natural selection leads populations to evolve towards a specific level of fairness (Van Segbroeck et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 108:158104, 2012), contingent on the nature and size of the collective dilemma faced by individuals.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSpringer Proceedings in Complexity
PublisherSpringer
Pages827-830
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-00394-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2013

Publication series

NameSpringer Proceedings in Complexity
ISSN (Print)2213-8684
ISSN (Electronic)2213-8692

Keywords

  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Fairness
  • N-Player games
  • Reciprocity
  • Repeated games

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