Honest Signaling: Learning Dynamics versus Evolutionary Stability

David Catteeuw, Bernard Manderick

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paper

    Abstract

    Until now, biologist have mostly studied under what circumstances honest signaling is stable. Stability, however, is not sufficient to explain the emergence of honest signaling. We observe that honest signaling can emerge through learning. The settings where honest signaling evolves, however, do not exactly match those where honest signaling is evolutionary stable. They do, however, match the set where honest signaling is a Pareto- optimal Nash equilibrium. As such, we provide an alternative explanation for the emergence and existence of honest signaling.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 21st Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning, BeneLearn 2012, Ghent, Belgium, May 24-25, 2012
    EditorsBernard De Baets, Bernard Manderick, Michael Rademaker, Willem Waegeman
    Pages1-6
    Number of pages6
    Publication statusPublished - 24 May 2012
    Event21st Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning - Ghent, Belgium
    Duration: 24 May 201225 May 2012

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the 21st Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning, BeneLearn 2012, Ghent, Belgium, May 24-25, 2012

    Conference

    Conference21st Belgian-Dutch Conference on Machine Learning
    Abbreviated titleBeneLearn
    Country/TerritoryBelgium
    CityGhent
    Period24/05/1225/05/12

    Bibliographical note

    Bernard De Baets, Bernard Manderick, Michael Rademaker, Willem Waegeman

    Keywords

    • honest signaling
    • handicap principle
    • reinforcement learning
    • evolutionary stable strategy

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