Activities per year
Abstract
Highly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have devolved fiscal power to regions in an asymmetric way. Some well-off regions get transfers that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system. We demonstrate in a political economy model of fiscal federalism that, in centralised countries, side-payments are used to compensate regions that are set back by the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. Compensation blocks political negotiation on alternative-more efficient-fiscal systems. We study two regions, Valle d'Aosta in Italy and Pais Vasco in Spain, as an example.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 305-320 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
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Dive into the research topics of ''If you want me to stay, pay': a model of asymmetric federalism in centralised countries'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Activities
- 5 Talk or presentation at a conference
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More Europe or more Subsidiarity
Peter Claeys (Invited speaker)
25 May 2015Activity: Talk or presentation › Talk or presentation at a conference
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Progressive Economy
Peter Claeys (Invited speaker)
4 Mar 2014Activity: Talk or presentation › Talk or presentation at a conference
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SPERI Conference
Peter Claeys (Invited speaker)
27 Jun 2013Activity: Talk or presentation › Talk or presentation at a conference