The neural basis and evolution of divergent and convergent thought

It is standard to define convergent thinking problems as those with only one correct solution and divergent thinking problems as open-ended problems with multiple solutions (Guilford, 1950; Runco, 2010), and to essentially equate creativity with the capacity for convergent and divergent thinking (e.g., Onarheim & Friis-Olivarius, 2013), with divergent thinking the more important of the two for creativity. However, this conception of divergent and convergent thinking does not align with what people think of as creative. First, not all tasks with multiple solutions require creative thinking, such as the task of responding to the question “what is something red?" Indeed, some problems with just one correct solution, such as the Remote Associates Test (RAT), require more creativity than coming up with things that are red. Second, it is often said that creative problem-solving tasks “require both convergent and divergent thinking” (e.g., Biggs, Fitzgerald, & Atkinson, 1971; Riddell et al., 2007). However, given the conventional view of convergent/divergent thinking problems this makes no sense, for a problem either has one solution or it has multiple solutions; it cannot have both. Third, and perhaps most importantly, does it really make sense to define creative thought in terms of the number of correct solutions, as opposed to the process by which those solutions are generated? In this chapter I hope to convince you that by looking to the neural level mechanisms underlying creative thought, and how these mechanisms evolved, we are led to a new conception of convergent and divergent thought. Specifically, I will argue that convergent thought is characterized not by the generation of a single correct solution, but by conceiving of concepts in their conventional contexts. Likewise, it will be argued that divergent thought is characterized not by the generation of multiple solutions, but by playing with “halo of potentiality” surrounding concepts - new affordances yielded by new contexts - to hone as few as a single idea. The chapter begins by summarizing a neural-level explanation for creative insight that arose from studies of the architecture of associative memory. It then outlines problems with conventional conceptions of divergent and convergent thought. Finally, it proposes a new conception of divergent and convergent thought that is consistent with the architecture of associative memory, evolutionary considerations, and empirical studies of divergent and convergent processing.