Abstract
Studies on EU–Africa migration cooperation often focus on the interests of the EU and its member states. But what do African states themselves seek to achieve with respect to migration policy? This article presents an in-depth look at Ghana and Senegal, two stable West African democracies, and assesses which types of migration policies they support, and why. We suggest that a distinction ought to be made between West African policymakers’ more domestically-driven migration policy goals (to cooperate more closely with the diaspora or creating legal migration channels, for example) and internationally-induced ones (such as the reinforcement of border control capacities). Each type of policy interest is defended by an increasingly diverse set of national actors whose interests often – but not always – converge. This distinction should be considered as a continuum, as most West African migration policy preferences are driven by domestic as well as international factors, albeit to diverging degrees. Our findings demonstrate that migration policy-making in countries targeted by international cooperation can only be studied as an ‘intermestic’ policy issue, reflecting the dynamic interplay of international and domestic interests.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 3101-3118 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Ethnic and Migration studies |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 15 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 17 Nov 2020 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:The legal basis of the Senegalese migration framework was established in 1971. It governs the conditions under which foreign nationals may enter, gain residency, and become established in the country (ICMPD ). Senegal's institutional landscape on migration has been described as ‘fragmented’. The most important ministries are the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for police and border police, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosting the Directorate General for Consular Affairs. The latter issues travel documents and is also responsible for documenting returnees. Another key player is the Directorate General for Diaspora (DGSE), which is part of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and handles policy and programme development for Senegalese living abroad. The DGSE has established numerous ‘Bureaus d’Acceuil et Orientation’ (BAOS) advising Senegalese who live abroad and their families about return options, reintegration prospects, and investment opportunities. The Directorate General for Employment negotiates labour agreements with third countries, aiming to create employment opportunities abroad. The Directorate General of Human Capital of the Ministry of Finance coordinated the National Migration Policy (NMP), which was developed between 2015 and 2018 and financed by the IOM development fund. Several other ministries, such as the national anti-trafficking unit of the Ministry of Justice, also handle migration-related issues. Since 2005, Senegal has enforced a harsh anti-smuggling and trafficking law imposing up to 10 years in prison for human traffickers, smugglers and document forgers (Vives , ). External actors were involved in almost all issue areas defining the country's migration policy. IOM, the EU, and EU member states particularly influenced the setup of key administrative units.
Funding Information:
In Ghana, the overall structure is similar. Due to its geographical position away from the Western or Central African migration routes to Europe, Ghana has been less of a priority country for the EU than Senegal with respect to migration cooperation (Van Criekinge ) even if the EU's interest has slowly but steadily grown since the 2010s. As in Senegal, Ghana's main ministries dealing with migration are also the Ministry of the Interior and Foreign Affairs. Within the structures of the Ministry of Interior, the ‘Ghana Immigration Service’ (GIS) deals with entry, residence and border policies. In 2014, the EU launched the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA) which sought to further strengthen the GIS's operational capacities. With the IOM as an implementing agency, the EU-led approach focused on strengthening the effectiveness of the Ghanaian border guard by giving them training and equipment, holding information campaigns, restructuring the Migration Information Bureau, and opening the new Sunyani Migration Information Centre. Similar to the setup in Senegal, the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoF) is responsible for issuing travel documents and handling return and diaspora affairs, with the latter being done by the Diaspora Affairs Bureau (DAB). The move of the DAB from the MoF to the office of the Presidency after the 2016 presidential elections possibly demonstrates the increased political salience of diaspora affairs in Ghana, also brought on by the announcement of voting rights for Ghanaians abroad. The Migration Policy Unit of the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of developing the National Migration Policy. This was finalised in 2016, also with financial support from IOM and other donors. Other actors such as the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana have also helped to develop Ghana's migration policy. A diaspora engagement policy, which has been in the drafting stage since 2011, is currently under revision. Additionally, the Labour Ministry drafted and launched a National Labour Migration Strategy in 2017, with the support of the ACP-EU migration action. In contrast to Senegal, Ghanaian civil society organisations have not strongly mobilised against the forced return of immigrants abroad. However, similar to Senegal, several national civil society organisations have engaged in the reintegration of returned nationals, mostly together with IOM.
Funding Information:
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support granted by the United Nations University - Institute for Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) and the Institute of European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (IES) for the project ‘African Migration: Root Causes and Regulatory Dynamics’ (AMIREG). During the fieldwork phase, Leonie Jegen was able to draw upon the support of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Dakar and its staff member Dr. Chantal Lacroix. The researchers thank the research assistants Mamadou Faye and Rosina Badwi for their invaluable support, as well as the numerous interviewees for offering their time and invaluable insights. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance of Laura Cunniff (Europa-Universität Flensburg) and the outstanding comments of the anonymous reviewers.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Copyright:
Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.