Description
In this contribution, we discuss if there is, or if there should be, a right to be excluded from the information society.Our contribution is motivated by an observation that, nowadays, various services have become available predominantly – and sometimes only – via the internet (e.g. banking services, passenger location forms or applications for social assistance). Overall, these days, life without internet access has become unduly burdensome and – at times – impossible. In result, these developments have deepened further the ‘divide’ between those who benefit therefrom and those who do not.
While we do not negate that the so-called ‘digital divide’ is a negative phenomenon, we argue that both the debates on, and the practice of, overcoming such a ‘divide’ tend to neglect a complementary point: while leaning towards a de facto obligatory inclusion in the information society, neglected is the choice of individuals not to partake therein.
In the first part of this contribution, from the perspective of global ethics, we critically revisit the old arguments for the inclusion (cf. e.g. the 1980 MacBride report) as well as recent ones (e.g. the 2003-2005 World Summit on the Information Society), but also overviewing the new ones, in particular those recently inspired by a public health crisis (cf. e.g. the case for access to education or e-justice). Most importantly, we posit that ‘inclusion’ has not been sufficiently defined and elaborated as it is presumed that everyone needs and wants to be included. Furthermore, any obligation to use technologies is often unfair, especially towards people who do not know how to or cannot afford to use them.
Therefore, in the second part, we argue that human rights could be successfully invoked to protect individuals against a de facto obligatory inclusion in the information society. The right not to use the internet, if there were any, constitutes a case in point here. This is nothing new as there exists (or, interpreted have been) already many human rights that safeguard some degree of exclusion, e.g. the right to privacy or the so-called negative aspects of the freedom of expression (e.g. a right not to express oneself) or assembly (e.g. a right not to join a social group). The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of e.g. age, income or literacy might also be invoked in this context. Alternatively, a new right to be excluded from the information society might be separately recognised.
Such a right to be excluded, subject to the principle of proportionality, will further safeguard the choice of individuals not to partake in the information society. We conclude by discussing the prospects of protecting (a degree of) exclusion by means of human rights.
Periode | 21 feb 2023 |
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Evenementstitel | IAMCR/UNESCO pre-conference: Governing the Internet for Democracy: Lessons from Research Embracing a Multicentred World |
Evenementstype | Conference |
Locatie | Paris, France |
Mate van erkenning | International |
Documenten & links
Gerelateerde inhoud
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Onderzoeksoutput
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Internet (access) as a new fundamental right. Inflating the current rights framework?
Onderzoeksoutput: Article › peer review
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It’s All About Choice: The Right Not to Use the Internet
Onderzoeksoutput: Blog › Research › peer review