Des qualités connues ou manifestes. De la « sympathie » selon Spinoza

This contribution investigates Spinoza’s concepts and reasoning from two crucial places, namely, firstly, the propositions 15 to 33 and the definitions of affects 8 and 33 in part three of the Ethics, and, secondly, propositions 29 to 37 in part four. These are two lines of thought that go hand in hand, that refer to each other and in which Spinoza tries to do something radically new. In the first, he wants to show that under the concept of sympathy, introduced by philosophers in the context of metaphysical dualism to designate a hidden quality, we can understand known or manifest qualities. Incidentally, the sympathy is replaced by a concept that is inherent to a geometric, perspectivist and phenomenological approach: ‘inclination’. The key elements of the reasoning are similarity, imitation of affects and image and/or imagination. In the second case, the argument focuses on what we desire under the guidance of reason, or the utility of such a life – again, imitation and similarity are central elements of the argument, which is now explicitly placed in the social context. A surplus is imposed, as is the question of who or what is our similar, and, consequently, the question of human nature. In addition to a reflection on the concepts and structure of reasoning, Spinoza’s contrapuntal method as ricercare, adapted to radical practical thinking, is examined.