Eccentric positionality as a precondition for the criminal liability of artificial life forms

Onderzoeksoutput: Chapter

Samenvatting

This contribution explores Plessner's distinction between animal centricity and human eccentricity as "a difference that makes a difference" for the attribution of criminal liability to artificial life forms (ALFs). Building on the work of Steels and Bourgine & Varela on artificial life and Matura & Varela's notion of autopoiesis I will reason that even if ALFs are autonomous in the sense even of having the capacity to rewrite their own program, this in itself is not enough to understand them as autonomous in the sense of instantiating an eccentric position that allows for reflection on their actions as their own actions. Evidently this also means that to the extent that ALFs do develop some sort of conscious self-reflection they would in principle qualify for the censure of the criminal law.
Originele taal-2English
TitelPlessner’s Philosophical Anthropology
RedacteurenJos De Mul
Plaats van productieAmsterdam
UitgeverijAmsterdam University Press
Pagina's407-424
Aantal pagina's17
ISBN van geprinte versie978-90-8964-634-7
StatusPublished - 2014

Bibliografische nota

De Mul, Jos

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