Evolution of Common-Pool Resources and Social Welfare in Structured Populations

The Anh Han, Tom Lenaerts

Onderzoeksoutput: Conference paper

5 Citaten (Scopus)

Samenvatting

The Common-pool resource (CPR) game is a social dilemma where agents have to decide how to consume a shared CPR. Either they each take their cut, completely destroying the CPR, or they restrain themselves, gaining less immediate pro?t but sustaining the resource and future pro?t. When no consumption takes place the CPR simply grows to its carrying capacity. As such, this dilemma provides a framework to study the evolution of social consumption strategies and the sustainability of re-sources, whose size adjusts dynamically through consumption and their own implicit population dynamics. The present study provides for the ?rsttime a detailed analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of consumption strategies in ?nite populations,focusing on the interplay between the resource levels and preferred consumption strategies. We show analytically which restrained consumers survive in relation to the growth rate of the resources and how this affects the resources' carrying capacity. Second, we show that population structures affect the sustainability of the resources and social welfare in the population. Current results provide an initial in-sight into the complexity of the CPR game, showing potential for a variety of different studies in the context of social welfare and resource sustainability
Originele taal-2English
TitelIn Proceedings of the 23nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
UitgeverijAAAI Press
Pagina's2848-2854
Aantal pagina's7
ISBN van geprinte versie978-1-57735-633-2
StatusPublished - aug 2013
EvenementUnknown - Beijing, China
Duur: 3 aug 20139 aug 2013

Publicatie series

NaamIn Proceedings of the 23nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Conference

ConferenceUnknown
Verkorte titelIJCAI'2013
Land/RegioChina
StadBeijing
Periode3/08/139/08/13

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