Evolution of fairness and conditional cooperation in public goods dilemmas

Sven Van Segbroeck, Jorge M. Pacheco, Tom Lenaerts, Francisco C. Santos

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1 Citaat (Scopus)

Samenvatting

Cooperation prevails in many collective endeavours. To ensure that co-operators are not exploited by free riders, mechanisms need to be put into place to protect them. Direct reciprocity, one of these mechanisms, relies on the facts that individuals often interact more than once, and that they are capable of retaliating when exploited. Yet in groups, strategies targeting retaliation against specific group members may be unfeasible, because individuals may not be able to identify clearly who contributed and who did not. Still, they may assess what constitutes a fair income from a collective endeavour. We discuss here how conditional cooperation in group interactions emerges naturally and how natural selection leads populations to evolve towards a specific level of fairness (Van Segbroeck et al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 108:158104, 2012), contingent on the nature and size of the collective dilemma faced by individuals.

Originele taal-2English
TitelSpringer Proceedings in Complexity
UitgeverijSpringer
Pagina's827-830
ISBN van geprinte versie978-3-319-00394-8
DOI's
StatusPublished - 1 jan 2013

Publicatie series

NaamSpringer Proceedings in Complexity
ISSN van geprinte versie2213-8684
ISSN van elektronische versie2213-8692

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