Roth-Erev Learning in Signaling and Language Games

David Catteeuw, Joachim De Beule, Bernard Manderick, Patrick De Causmaecker (Redacteur), Joris Maervoet (Redacteur), Tommy Messelis (Redacteur), Katja Verbeeck (Redacteur), Tim Vermeulen (Redacteur)

Onderzoeksoutput: Conference paper

3 Citaten (Scopus)


The relation between Lewis' signaling game framework and Steels' language game framework is dis- cussed. The problem of pooling equilibria in signaling games is approached from both angles. Previous results about the requirements on learning for escaping pooling equilibria and achieving convergence are refined, and it is discussed why Roth Erev learning with forgetting should be a good learning rule in this context. This is confirmed empirically in simulation.
Originele taal-2English
Pagina's (van-tot)67-74
Aantal pagina's8
TijdschriftProceedings of the Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence
StatusPublished - nov 2011
Evenement23rd Benelux Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Gent, Belgium
Duur: 3 nov 20114 nov 2011

Bibliografische nota

Patrick De Causmaecker, Joris Maervoet, Tommy Messelis, Katja Verbeeck, Tim Vermeulen


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