Self-Interested Agents can Bootstrap Symbolic Communication if They Punish Cheaters.

Luc Steels, Emily Wang

Onderzoeksoutput: Conference paper

Samenvatting

We examine the social prerequisites for symbolic communication by studying a language game embedded within a signaling game, in which cooperation is possible but unenforced, and agents have incentive to deceive. Despite this incentive, and even with persistent cheating, naming conventions can still arise from strictly local interactions, as long as agents employ sufficient mechanisms to detect deceit. However, unfairly antagonistic strategies can undermine lexi- cal convergence. Simulated agents are shown to evolve trust relations simultaneously with symbolic communication, suggesting that human language need not be predicated upon exist- ing social relationships, although the cognitive capacity for social interaction seems essential. Thus, language can develop given a balance between restrained deception and revocable trust. Unconditional cooperation and outright altruism are not necessary.
Originele taal-2English
TitelThe Evolution of Language. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Evolution of Language
RedacteurenA.d.m. Smith, K. Smith, R. Ferrer-i-cancho
UitgeverijWorld Scientific Publishing
Pagina's362-369
Aantal pagina's8
ISBN van geprinte versie978-981-277-611-2
StatusPublished - 2008

Publicatie series

NaamThe Evolution of Language. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Evolution of Language

Bibliografische nota

A.D.M. Smith, K. Smith, R. Ferrer-i-Cancho

Vingerafdruk

Duik in de onderzoeksthema's van 'Self-Interested Agents can Bootstrap Symbolic Communication if They Punish Cheaters.'. Samen vormen ze een unieke vingerafdruk.

Citeer dit