The Assessing Status & Outlook of Russian Arms Sales: What the Lessons should be Drawn from the EU's Restrictive Measures

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
Russia has maintained its status in the international arms transfer, the second largest exporter, from the end of Cold War to 2016. Since the crisis in Ukraine crisis caused by the illegal annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and the onset of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, although the EU’s progressively restrictive measures imposed on Russian defense companies, arm and dual-use trade will be extended to mid-2017.
There is a question whether the EU’s restrictive measures has not made practical
effectiveness against Russian defense industries. As two pillar of the increasingly
gloomy Russian economy, arms sales and oil & gas export will be more important
than ever. To deter Russian jeopardized escalation, how to prompt the effectiveness of restrictive measures upon Russian defense industries is a serious, practical issue.
In this paper, the author suggests the method to improve the effectiveness of
sanctions against target’s defense industries should be a systemic regime following the life-cycle of arms and weapon range R&D to transfer procedure. The life-cycle of arms and weapon is constituted by R&D, test, manufacture, maintaining and out of services. The sanctions against defense capability should focus on the key issues in different segments. For example, at the initial R&D phase, stopping the external funding flow to the related projects.
Through the empirical investigations, the survival of Russian defense economy
heavily depends on its international arms transfers to India and China in the past two decades. With the prominent development of defense industries, China’s import from Russia has progressively decreased. India will be the most significant market. Hence, to promote the effectiveness of restrictive measures against Russian defense industries, the EU should review the restrictive measures apply to Indian entities with the connections of Russian defense industries, according to the principle of the secondary and tertiary sanction.
In the conclusion, the EU should review its institution of restrictive measures with the absence of extraterritorial judiciary.
This paper is constituted by the following sections:
1. Introduction
2. Theoretically framework:
The role of arms transfers in defense industries development;
The functions and effectiveness of economic sanctions;
3. The empirical investigations
A) The overview of EU’s restrictive measures against Russian since 2014;
B) Russian defense R&D institution and the balance of arms export;
4. Conclusion and policy suggestions
Extraterritorial Judiciary in restrictive measures