Why so hard to say sorry: evolution of apology with commitments in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

The Anh Han, Tom Lenaerts, Pereira Luis Moniz

Onderzoeksoutput: Conference paper


When making a mistake, individuals can apologize to secure further cooperation, even if the apology is costly. Similarly, individuals arrange commitments to guarantee that an action such as a co-operative one is in the others' best interest, and thus will be carried out to avoid eventual penal-ties for commitment failure. Hence, both apology and commitment should go side by side in behavioral evolution. Here we provide a computational model showing that apologizing acts are rare in non-committed interactions, especially whenever cooperation is very costly, and that arranging prior commitments can considerably increase the frequency of such behavior. In addition, we show that in both cases, with or without commitments, apology works only if it is sincere, i.e. costly enough.Most interestingly, our model predicts that individuals tend to use much costlier apology in commit-ted relationships than otherwise, because it helps better identify free-riders such as fake committers:
commitments bring about sincerity. Furthermore,we show that this strategy of apology supported by commitments outperforms the famous existent strategies of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
Originele taal-2English
TitelIn Proceedings of the 23nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
UitgeverijAAAI Press
Aantal pagina's7
ISBN van geprinte versie978-1-57735-633-2
StatusPublished - aug 2013
EvenementUnknown - Beijing, China
Duur: 3 aug 20139 aug 2013

Publicatie series

NaamIn Proceedings of the 23nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence


Verkorte titelIJCAI'2013

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